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John Henry Schlegel  
and The Muppet Show 
ALFRED S. KONEFSKY† 
I intend to take seriously Schlegel’s admonition, which 
was a kind of proxy for a call for papers, that we are to engage 
in “serious fun,” because if anyone knows how to have fun 
being serious, it’s Schlegel. And Schlegel’s fun is not 
frivolous, though it contains an element of whimsy, and I 
would and will argue that in some sense it is the key to 
understanding his work in the classroom and in his 
scholarship because it captures a certain critical stance that 
animates that work. (That is not to say that Schlegel does 
not know how to laugh, which he often does, even at himself. 
Indeed, you could often hear Schlegel’s voice and laugh 
reverberating off the walls in the stairwells and hallways of 
the law school, well before he appeared at your office door.) 
In order to set the scene, I want to recur to a certain 
pattern established early in my relationship with him as a 
 
†University at Buffalo Distinguished Professor Emeritus, University at Buffalo 
School of Law, State University of New York. I would like to thank Robert Berger, 
Barry Cushman, David Engel, George Kannar, Bruce Mann, Lynn Mather, 
Matthew Steilen, Robert Steinfeld, Barry Sullivan, Winnifred Sullivan, David 
Westbrook, and G. Edward White for reading and commenting on this symposium 
contribution. In particular, Dianne Avery patiently provided an extremely 
thoughtful, perceptive, and careful reading, proving once again that it may take 
more than one person to understand Schlegel, who characteristically did not wish 
to read this paper, saying “I’ll deal with it later.” Nevertheless, I need to thank 
him anyway, for more than forty years of reading, conversation, and friendship. 
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colleague and friend. For almost forty years, Schlegel and I 
talked on the phone once or twice nearly every day (not 
texted or emailed). A typical phone call might begin with 
Schlegel calling and starting the conversation midthought, 
beginning with a stream of consciousness, often excited, 
occasionally annoyed, always engaged, that expressed his 
desire to communicate something he had just discovered, 
observed, or read, or discussed with someone else, a 
byproduct of the restless range of his intellectual curiosity. I 
usually let him talk for about 45 seconds or a minute before 
gently interrupting him and saying something like, 
“Schlegel, what the hell are you talking about?” (Though it is 
possible that I didn’t always say “hell.”) He, of course, simply 
assumed I knew what was on his mind and where it came 
from. He would then explain what prompted the phone call, 
and then it would become apparent why he wanted to share 
the experience, insight, or information. But just as I became 
fully locked into the conversation, he was gone. I mean gone 
in a flash, just abruptly hanging up, usually not even saying 
good-bye, often again in midsentence just as he had entered. 
Having accomplished his goal, his business with me was 
done and he simply moved on, as in disappeared. The first 
time this happened I said to myself, “Well, that was rude,” or 
weird. But I just got used to it, and when I checked around, 
I realized the pattern occurred with nearly everybody. All he 
wanted to do was to share something with you that he 
thought might interest you or that he had learned. He was 
engaging in an act of intellectual community and kinship. At 
his core, Schlegel is an old-fashioned gentleman. He wasn’t 
being rude; it was just Schlegel being Schlegel.  
This brings me to the story of how these phone calls 
began, which in retrospect I realize has everything to do with 
Schlegel’s work. We started talking on the phone regularly 
in the late 1970s when we both realized that one evening a 
week we both sat down with our kids in our respective homes 
to watch The Muppet Show. For the children, the Muppets 
were this wonderful mashup of antic and manic characters 
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dressed in odd garb, doing wild things, gesturing in overly 
expressive ways, making fun of each other, finding 
themselves in improbable situations with improbable guests, 
or having fun in constant and loud motion. It all had a certain 
innocent and harmless charm about it for kids. But let’s face 
it. The show was really for adults, though its ability easily to 
bridge the generations was part of the attraction. The jokes 
and funny lines, however, were for grownups, incorporating 
some really serious political and cultural satire, with a tone 
of irreverence, and trenchant, if not subversive, commentary 
on and observations about the world we occupied.  
Precisely one minute after the show ended each week, 
the phone would ring and what became our ritual would 
start. It was Schlegel asking, “What did you think?” And so 
the serious process of deconstruction would begin as we 
walked through the show again. What did we like or not like? 
What worked or did not work? And invariably we focused on 
two characters. Not Oscar the Grouch (as one might expect 
from Schlegel) or the Count (who found his way into a title of 
a Schlegel article1). They were Sesame Street characters 
anyway. But Statler and Waldorf, the two elderly 
curmudgeons seated in a theater box overlooking the stage, 
who spewed totally dismissive comments about what they 
were watching. They were nothing but critical of what they 
saw, throwing off one-liners eviscerating what they were 
witnessing on the show though they never left and kept 
watching, endlessly entertained and contemptuous. They 
would occasionally ask each other why they continued to 
observe the show, and they could be critical of themselves for 
not fleeing. We both found a natural affinity for them.  
  
 
 1. John Henry Schlegel, Drawing Back from the Abyss, or Lessons Learned 
from Count von Count, 1 THE CRIT 16 (2008). I suppose here is as good a place as 
any to say it, but Schlegel consistently leads the league with the most arresting 
article titles in the business. (I’m not sure he really works on them; they just seem 
to trip naturally off his tongue.) And as a bonus every once in a while, they tip 
you off as to what the article is actually about. 
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Now here is the interesting twist to Statler and Waldorf. 
Jim Henson, the creator of the Muppets, in fact played the 
character of Waldorf. Henson was one of the extraordinary 
cultural geniuses of late twentieth-century America, but 
consider for a moment his stance as he inhabited the 
heckling character of Waldorf. Henson was actually 
participating in an active critique of what he had just created 
and to which he was fully committed and in which he was 
entrenched. And Henson as Waldorf is sort of emblematic of 
Schlegel’s role as a legal educator and a legal historian, 
offering up his critical intelligence in a system of thought in 
which he is embedded after having invested some creative 
capital in the enterprise. Schlegel, a contrarian by nature 
like Waldorf, has a kind of roving commission as a critic at 
large, almost a literary critic. But like Waldorf, what he 
really wants to know is what in the show works or how it 
works, what doesn’t work, or how do things function. In that 
sense, in addition to being a critic of sorts, Schlegel is also a 
kind of mechanical engineer with his eye on the design of 
various moving parts in law and history, and who then 
attempts to determine whether those parts operate as 
designed, though there is nothing at all mechanical about 
Schlegel.  
At this point, it’s a fair question to ask so how does this 
relate to Schlegel’s actual work and method? I want to divide 
the discussion into two parts, one focused on his teaching and 
one on his scholarship, though most of what I will have to say 
about his written work will center on something that most 
people have probably not read, his long and remarkable book 
manuscript on the economic history of the city of Buffalo and 
the role of law therein. 
I. 
Beginning in the early 1980s, Schlegel began requiring 
his corporations students to obtain a student subscription to 
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the Wall Street Journal.2 Among other historical moments 
and actors, these were the heady junk bond days of Michael 
Milken and the corporate raiding and greenmail time of 
Boone Pickens. And Schlegel would begin each and every 
class with the same simple question: “What’s in today’s 
paper?” Before his students encountered law (if they were 
ever to encounter law), they had to answer the question: 
what happened today or yesterday in the real world? Kind of 
a risky strategy in a law school when you think about it. 
Why did he start class that way? First, the move was an 
expression of and adaptation to Schlegel’s deep antipathy to 
many of the corporations casebooks of the time, with their 
emphasis on legal doctrine, and his own thorough skepticism 
about the efficacy of legal rules. Schlegel did not think the 
place to start was law. Second, he thought instead that 
students needed to know what corporate behavior looked 
like, including an examination of what corporations were 
trying to accomplish, how they went about achieving their 
purposes or goals, how they structured transactions, what 
the pieces of paper they drafted and issued looked like, and 
how they responded to the needs and demands of their 
clients. In a way, Schlegel was trying to inculcate Karl 
Llewellyn’s “situation sense”3 in law students at an early 
stage (and not just in judges), “to root discussion and 
observations in the soil of practice, of common knowledge,”4 
and “to indicate the type-facts in their context.”5 Llewellyn 
had warned that “delving into books rather than into life to 
find situation-reason or rule-reason must, of course, when 
the books are narrow, constrict the trove.”6 So in a sense, 
Schlegel’s pedagogical strategy was an extension of some 
 
 2. The following account is based on conversations with Schlegel and, in 
some ways, my interpretation of his rendering of his practice. 
 3. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 
121–57 (1960). 
 4. Id. at 59. 
 5. Id. at 60. 
 6. Id. at 166. 
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corners of the legal realist agenda, and it had two organizing 
principles capturing two interrelated and potentially 
contradictory reasons.  
Drawing also on early law and society literature, 
Schlegel first wanted students to see law in action. If you 
want to see law in action, read the Journal. But second, and 
the real purpose, was that he wanted students to understand 
that, from his perspective, corporate behavior had little or 
nothing to do with law, or in other words how little corporate 
law mattered. Rules did not reflect what was really going on. 
Markets might help to answer that question. It was almost 
as if corporations and their officers decided what they 
wanted to do, and then they looked around for the law that 
would allow them to do it or justify their behavior, or they 
shaped the law to help them accomplish their goals. In other 
words, there might be a conflict between wanting students to 
see the law in action, but at the same time presenting them 
with evidence that law was not much in action. 
Schlegel occasionally coupled the daily Wall Street 
Journal reading exercise with a set of his own selected cases 
culled from the Delaware Supreme Court. The dozen or so 
cases in a sense supplemented the daily foray into the news. 
They tended to focus on director and officer obligations and 
liabilities and corporate transactions, and in Schlegel’s view 
they captured the attitudes of an important court in the 
world of corporate law that was not hostile to but suspicious 
of corporate behavior. In the aggregate, the question was 
what did the cases say about what we would now call 
corporate responsibility. The organizing premise was 
disarmingly simple. We are going to explore how things work 
in reality in order to better prepare you to practice law. In 
the process you might learn a little law to help you navigate 
the system of corporate behavior. 
II. 
I would argue that similar themes and concerns animate 
Schlegel’s enormously diverse scholarship. From legal 
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realism7 to critical legal studies (his Stanford article on an 
“intimate, opinionated, and affectionate history” of CLS8 
seems to me to be a very good example of Statler and Waldorf 
in action, bringing the critical gaze and observations from 
both off stage and simultaneously embedded, except that it 
was far too “affectionate” for Waldorf’s taste), to legal 
education (including the institutions themselves,9 what 
passes for past and current theories of legal education,10 the 
professional identity of legal academics,11 and the 
relationship or dance between them all), to his constant 
exploration and criticism of the parameters and foundational 
principles of intellectual history and the art and challenge of 
doing history,12 to legal theory and legal scholarship,13 to his 
 
 7. See JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL 
SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995) [hereinafter SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM]. 
 8. John Henry Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and 
Affectionate History of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 
391 (1984). 
 9. Alfred S. Konefsky & John Henry Schlegel, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: 
Histories of American Law Schools, 95 HARV. L. REV. 833 (1982). 
 10. See John Henry Schlegel, Those Weren’t “The Good Old Days,” Just the 
Old Days: Laura Kalman on Yale Law School in the Sixties, 32 LAW & SOC. INQ. 
841 (2007) (review of LAURA KALMAN, YALE LAW SCHOOL AND THE SIXTIES: REVOLT 
AND REVERBERATIONS (2005)); see also John Henry Schlegel & David M. Trubek, 
Charles E. Clark and the Reform of Legal Education, in JUDGE CHARLES EDWARD 
CLARK 81 (Peninah Petruck ed., 1991); John Henry Schlegel, Langdell’s Legacy 
Or, The Case of the Empty Envelope, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1517 (1984) (reviewing 
ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO 
THE 1980S (1983) and CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON RESEARCH AND EDUCATION IN LAW, 
LAW AND LEARNING: REPORT TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES RESEARCH 
COUNCIL OF CANADA (1983)).  
 11. John Henry Schlegel, Between the Harvard Founders and the Legal 
Realists: The Professionalization of the American Law Professor, 35 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 311 (1985). 
 12. John Henry Schlegel, Does Duncan Kennedy Wear Briefs or Boxers? Does 
Richard Posner Ever Sleep? Writing About Jurisprudence, High Culture and the 
History of Intellectuals, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 277 (1997) (review of NEIL DUXBURY, 
PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995)). 
 13. John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Theory and American Legal 
Education: A Snake Swallowing Its Tail?, in CRITICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: AN 
AMERICAN-GERMAN DEBATE 49 (Christian Joerges & David Trubek eds., 1989). 
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objections to the constraining power of the tyranny of the 
lines drawn between academic disciplines (both within and 
outside of law) as an inhibiting force in obtaining real 
knowledge that mattered,14 to economic change and its 
history and its connection to law.15 Schlegel is pretty 
insistent and consistent in trying to parse out how things 
work, function, and operate. He is also somewhat unsparing 
in his evaluation and critique of the success of those 
institutions and ideas and people associated with them, glad 
to point to what their failures may be, and he tells us so in 
his introductory notes to this conference.16  
I want to focus, however, on just one of Schlegel’s 
scholarly contributions, one that is a major accomplishment 
though as yet unpublished, and which I think illustrates his 
method of doing history and the incorporation of his attitudes 
about the craft. The book, entitled “While Waiting for Rain: 
Community, Economy and Law in a Time of Change,”17 is a 
long meditation on the forces of economic change in late 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century America that ultimately 
focuses on the impact of those forces on the City of Buffalo 
and leads to a searching interrogation in painstaking detail 
of the reasons for the city’s decline over time. The book 
contains speculation about the nature of economic 
development, the role of law in the process of economic 
change, Buffalo’s place in the path of that development and 
 
 14. See John Henry Schlegel, From High in the Paper Tower, An Essay on von 
Humboldt’s University, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 865 (2004). 
 15. See John Henry Schlegel, Law and Economic Change During the Short 
Twentieth Century, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 563 (Michael 
Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008) [hereinafter Schlegel, Law and 
Economic Change]. 
 16. I have to say that I was pretty struck by his own summary of the 
organizing premises of his work. I had already started to work on this Essay 
before I first read his “Notes,” and I had already told him about what I was 
thinking of writing. He said to me: “Yes, that’s it.” I don’t know if I felt better or 
worse. 
 17. John Henry Schlegel, While Waiting for Rain: Community, Economy and 
Law in a Time of Change 1 (2017) [hereinafter Schlegel, While Waiting for Rain] 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Buffalo Law Review). 
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change, and what the future might hold. In places it is deeply 
informed by the work and urban theory of Jane Jacobs, 
particularly The Death and Life of Great American Cities 
(1961), The Economy of Cities (1969), and Cities and the 
Wealth of Nations (1984). Jacobs wanted to know how cities 
work and how cities fail. So does Schlegel; it is easy to see 
why he would have been attracted to her writing on the 
subject and why Buffalo became his case study. 
Schlegel’s book is divided into five parts, the first three 
of which I want to discuss. Part I is a broad, sweeping 
description of law and economic change in America, 
beginning with a brief sketch of economic life before the Civil 
War, but primarily devoting attention to the late nineteenth 
century and particularly the twentieth century. He had 
rehearsed some of his themes in his discussion of the 
twentieth century in his essay on law and economic change 
in The Cambridge History of Law in America.18 Part II 
switches to a parallel account of “community and economic 
change in America: Buffalo,”19 more or less lining up Buffalo 
with the corresponding decades and events in the greater 
American economy. And Part III on “thinking about 
economic development”20 seeks to apply the insights of 
Jacobs’s work to the Buffalo experience. So the thick 
description of the history of the Buffalo economic story is in 
effect placed between the bookends of two types of context, 
the greater American experience and the theoretical work of 
Jacobs on what animates the success and failure of economic 
life and community in urban environments. 21 
  
 
 18.  Schlegel, Law and Economic Change, supra note 15. 
 19.  Schlegel, While Waiting for Rain, supra note 17, at 101. 
 20.  Id. at 189. 
 21.  Parts IV and V of the book manuscript offer Schlegel’s speculations about 
what the future holds both for Buffalo and the United States, based on his 
understanding of what has passed before in the economic experiences of each. 
Though interesting, they are somewhat tangential to my concerns here. See 
generally id. at 225–323. 
110 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  69 
In each of these three parts, Schlegel maintains a certain 
integrity of methodological inquiry. In Part I, by exploring 
law’s relationship to economic change, he emphasizes how 
law works or does not work. He repeatedly asks about the 
process of economic change, “What’s law got to do with it?” 
In Part II, he describes what drove economic change in 
Buffalo, what dynamic elements were introduced that led to 
growth and decline, and how did they function individually 
and in interaction with each other; in other words how did 
they arise and how did they work. In Part III, he uses the 
models developed by Jacobs to forge a theory of sorts about 
how economic change and community function, in order to 
explain or make some sense of the Buffalo experience. Each 
of the three parts explores law, economic change, and 
community, and the themes in each part occasionally 
overlap.  
II. A. 
Schlegel begins his interrogation of law and economic 
change in Part I with two questions of definition, economy 
and law. Economy means “a persistent market structure that 
is the fusion of an understanding of economic life with the 
patterns of behavior within the economic, political, and social 
institutions that enact that understanding.”22 In Schlegel’s 
rendering, the economy is a kind of capitalist machine that 
would go of itself, or to mix metaphors, a sort of system of 
feedback loops. Law is defined as “the many and variable 
actions undertaken by lawyers and other governmental 
officials, the formal and effective norms originating from the 
practices of these individuals, and the systematic 
presuppositions shared among them.”23 Norms, practices, 
and presuppositions all seem related to the legal realist 
agenda that occupied Schlegel in the earlier portion of his 
 
 22.  Id. at 19. 
 23.  Id. at 19–20. 
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scholarly career,24 and speak in some ways to the work of 
Willard Hurst.25 As Schlegel traverses the terrain of two 
hundred years of American economic life leading to the 
twenty-first century, he finds the steady unfolding of 
economic innovation coupled with Schumpeter’s creative 
destruction,26 from the “archipelago of agricultural/trading 
economies,”27 to the rise of competition, the efforts to tame 
competition, the associationalist ideal and how it worked, the 
unraveling of the late twentieth-century economy and 
norms, and the attempts to restore them. Along the way, one 
encounters financial panics, depressions, wars, patterns of 
economic growth and decline, and learns about a dizzying 
array of economic activities, organizations, and actors. 
From time to time, Schlegel pauses after describing 
economic behavior in particular decades or an era and asks 
in a very skeptical voice, “What’s law got to do with it?”28 
Depending on the situation (and the distinctive moments of 
economic development and change, the devil is in the 
details), the answer is, “[e]verything and often nothing.”29 
“Everything” includes  
the great, mostly silent work of law constantly refining 
understandings of mine and thine, of property and contract, and 
also of the institutional structures within which all of life is lived. 
These refinements are most often marginal changes in law, though 
sometime over a long period of time what was first marginal may 
cumulatively turn out to be something close to transformative[,]30  
  
 
 24.  SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 7. 
 25.  See JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE 
GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS (1950). 
 26.  John Henry Schlegel, On the Many Flavors of Capitalism or Reflections 
on Schumpeter’s Ghost, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 965 (2009). 
 27.  Schlegel, While Waiting for Rain, supra note 17, at 21–26. 
 28.  Id. at 24. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
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like married women’s property rights or the law of master 
and servant. Most of the refinements are “matters of state 
law,”31 often positive law. In the economic realm before the 
Civil War, Schlegel sees the “silent work” of law “going on.”32 
There are exceptions, “[b]ut most of it [law] passes silently, 
noticed only in retrospect as patterns become clear, the law 
as a vast janitorial organization cleaning up after life.”33 
And, of course, in Schlegel’s retelling, pre-Civil War, “[o]ne 
might easily claim that law did nothing during these years”34 
or at least was “very close” to fitting into “being a part of the 
great silent background of law.”35 (Examples include the 
tariff, the federal budget, the postal service, post roads, ports 
and navigable waterways and their maintenance in the 
federal domain, and, on the state and local level, building 
canals and investing in early railroads.) 
Schlegel recurs to the question after his description of 
the 1870s and 1880s:  
Again, the question “What’s law got to do with it?” comes to mind. 
Even after noting the work in establishing a national paper 
currency, that of facilitating the expansion of railroads and 
populating the lands west of the Mississippi, and that of beginning 
railroad regulation, this question persists. The answer, of course, 
depends on what “it” is.36  
But that “is not to say that there was no law around. 
When there is trouble[,] . . . at least American people go to 
law.”37 As to problems of competition, and pools, cartels, 
trusts, and monopolies during this period, however,  
[g]oing to law was not by any means a wholly successful strategy 
for any actor in these or any other years. Law sometimes helps, but 
 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. at 31. 
 37.  Id. at 33. 
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often does not . . . . And when law helps it sometimes supplies just 
what was asked for, but often supplies something quite different. 
And whether it delivers what was asked for or something different, 
what it delivers may have the intended results, but often does not. 
Indeed, perversely, sometimes law’s help makes things worse.38  
So “[n]either the Interstate Commerce Act nor the Sherman 
Antitrust Act turned out to work exactly as their supporters 
wanted or their opponents feared. Law is, after all is said and 
done, an ambiguous tool in the hands of citizens.”39 
The hallmarks of Schlegel’s work are prevalent: a core 
examination of how things actually work (law and/or 
economy) or, if they work as designed, skepticism about legal 
rules and their efficacy. He places law more or less firmly at 
the margins (at least of economic life), where private law 
rules reside primarily in the background, more or less 
silently controlling the ebb and flow of economic activity. 
Legislators create law to supplement the basic underlying 
legal rules of social and economic organization in order to 
either facilitate or restrain change.  
For the 1890s through the entry of the United States in 
World War I, Schlegel tells us “[t]hat law has something to 
do with this part of my story of an extraordinary period of 
industrial expansion followed by one of industrial 
concentration is relatively obvious. What is not obvious is the 
answer.”40 The 1920s and 1930s brought further 
transformations and deep shocks to economic systems, which 
challenged assumed faiths and coincided with the emergence 
of new industries and technology (the widening spread of 
electrical power, automobiles, air travel, radios, etc.).  
For the 1920s and 1930s, Schlegel spells out the core 
ideas governing much of economic thought, the 
associationalist ideal. He defines the ideal as  
  
 
 38.  Id. at 33–34. 
 39.  Id. at 34. 
 40.  Id. at 39. 
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essentially a Main Street, though not therefore a small town, 
theory. It hoped to maintain high wages through the high prices 
that would support the small, local retail or wholesale businesses 
that were being undercut by the growth of so-called “discounters,” 
large regional or national retailers, as well as the more competitive 
sectors of the producer economy. . . . [Its] design . . . was for an 
economy of uniform, high prices, such as that found in more 
oligopolistic markets . . . .41 
It was, however, “[n]ot laissez-faire in a different guise” for 
it “assumed some level of governmental involvement in the 
economy.”42 
As to law, “[t]he Twenties and Thirties further 
sharpen[ed] questions about the relationship between law 
and economic change.”43 The New Deal legislation, in 
response to economic turmoil “in agriculture, banking, 
communications, labor, securities, and transportation . . . 
also exemplif[ed] the way that law is regularly mobilized in 
times of trouble. All were significant changes in the doctrinal 
matrix that is the law at a time and place.”44 But at the end 
of the day, Schlegel tells us “the role that these statutes 
played in economic change remains unclear.”45 And “[l]aw 
changes lots of things in the details of economic life for the 
participants without bringing about a transformation of the 
economy from one enacted understanding of economic life to 
another.”46 
So too was associationalism at work in the 1940s and 
1950s. “The continued authority of the Associationalist ideal 
of managed, rather than ruinous, competition seemingly 
protected retail business owners, though here the 
development of new national chains . . . ought to have given 
 
 41.  Id. at 46. 
 42.  Id. at 47. 
 43.  Id. at 49. 
 44.  Id. at 49–50. 
 45.  Id. at 50. 
 46.  Id. at 51. 
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careful observers pause.”47 What emerged “in retrospect was 
a hot-house economy, insulated from competition abroad and 
limited in competitive pressures at home,” and it produced “a 
dramatic increase in the size of the middle class, both white 
collar and blue.”48 It was “built on three things: reasonably 
high wages[,] low housing costs, . . . and the extension of 
college education.”49  
As the economy hummed along in the 1940s and 1950s, 
law was “quite silent as well.”50 The only major pieces of 
economic legislation were the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 and 
the Interstate Highway Act of 1957. But according to 
Schlegel, “[t]he relative silence of law is, of course, 
misleading. Narrowly conceived as the formal and effective 
norms originating from governmental entities, especially the 
law of property, contract and theft, . . . law is always there, 
the modest hum of a faithful dynamo.”51  
One might say that Schlegel is ambivalent about law, 
however he defines it (including actions undertaken by 
government officials, which presumably includes making law 
through legislation). I do not think he is agnostic about law; 
he has a stance (law is at best marginal). Though I think it 
is closer to the truth to describe him as profoundly skeptical 
about law and its influence on matters of economic change, 
sort of legal realism amplified by critical legal studies. Law’s 
impact may be differentially measured in long-term 
economic changes (incremental at best, though occasionally 
transformative) as opposed to short-term economic changes 
(perhaps more influential when specifically targeted and 
focused). And when law is invoked as an example of the 
formal intention to make changes economically, it almost 
always is in the realm of legislation or positive law. (It is also 
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quite possible, of course, to argue that some examples of 
social legislation mattered, including economically even in 
the face of resistance, like the Civil Rights Act of 1964.)  
The specter of Schlegel as a positivist is more than a little 
unnerving, until one understands that he does not think 
that, in other than a few instances, legislation or “law” 
mattered much anyway or at all. He might concede that 
sometimes margins matter. So he constantly refers to law as 
doing nothing, being silent, or engaging in silent work, or the 
silent background of law, amounting to only marginal change 
around the edges, sometimes helpful and sometimes making 
things worse (when you go to law), generally being around, 
or occupying an unclear or ambiguous role. At the very least, 
he seems to be calling for a kind of Hippocratic oath for law: 
do no harm. In the process, he sort of elides the 
methodological quicksand, flirting with functionalism 
(except that his solution conveniently is that law does not 
matter a good deal of the time), and winking at problems of 
causation as they glide by (he offers no speculation about how 
or why “the great silent background of law” was constituted). 
In the parts of his book that discuss first, Buffalo, and then, 
Jane Jacobs, law is barely mentioned at all, in effect 
dropping out, hovering as an indifferent ghost observing the 
chaos below. 
II. B. 
How Buffalo rose and fell is the subject of Part II of 
Schlegel’s book where he spells out in granular detail what 
composed the Buffalo economy and how it functioned. 
Beginning his recounting of Buffalo’s long economic journey 
with the decision to build the Erie Canal and have it 
terminate at Buffalo Creek, Schlegel notes that  
[h]ere the lake boats and the canal boats would exchange their 
differing cargos at a harbor that, like much of the canal, was frozen 
over anywhere from two to five months a year. Here Buffalo Creek  
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would be deepened and widened until that sluggish stream was 
transformed into the equally sluggish Buffalo River. The entrepôt 
at the east end of Lake Erie would be Buffalo.52  
The goal was to open up a western water route for the ports 
of New York to facilitate the movement of commerce and 
people rather than force that transshipment of goods and 
relocation of persons to take place over traditional overland 
routes.  
Buffalo’s economy was partially forged by geographic 
fortune. Its location was “a partner in economic destiny.”53 
For “[g]eography meant that, wherever the Erie Canal would 
terminate, the economy of the city that would grow up at that 
terminus initially would be founded on trade and 
transport.”54 And, as Schlegel reminds us,  
[i]ndeed, Buffalo’s status as a trading place, an entrepôt, was soon 
confirmed when in 1843 the most western of the rail lines that 
would later comprise the New York Central Railroad followed the 
canal builder’s identification of the flattest route from New York 
City and so allowed trains from Albany to reach Buffalo.55 
Buffalo then became “a major grain storage center, . . . 
develop[ing] the first steam driven mechanical device for 
unloading the [grain] boats [from the Midwest], as well as 
the first grain elevator.”56 Both the canal and the railroad 
spurred the arrival of immigrants, some on their way further 
west, but some who stayed.57 “Foundries and other metal 
shaping businesses grew in Buffalo starting in the 1840[s].”58  
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And after the Civil War, “these four resources—water, rail, 
grain and metalworking—formed the basis for Buffalo’s 
economy.”59 
The local geography was organized around water and 
rail. One street grid was “radial, from a point near the 
waterfront[;] . . . [t]he other [was] rectilinear, seemingly 
centered on the same spot, but in fact centered on a street, 
Main Street, two blocks to the east.”60 The problem with the 
competing plans to organize the city was that they obviously 
did not contemplate the proliferation of railroads serving and 
traversing the streets of the city and attempting to get close 
to the canal and lake. “The rail routes ran east to west at 
street level all the way. They effectively cut the city in two, 
separating north from south,”61 and eventually “the 
agglomeration of rail lines was noticeably misaligned with 
the original radial pattern of the streets.”62 Not surprisingly, 
“[i]ndustrial employment followed neither the radial nor the 
gridded street plan, but instead the water—the lake, both 
rivers, and the canal system—as well as the railroads.”63 
So what of the early life of “community” along with law 
and economic change?  
The spatial configuration of employment in the context of the 
geography of the city meant that wherever one lived, getting to work 
was not easy, at least unless one worked in the neighborhood so that 
walking was possible. Thus the chaotic overlay of street plans, 
railroads and employment opportunities fostered the growth of 
strong, isolated neighborhoods. It was in these neighborhoods that 
the ethnic structure of Buffalo was formed.64  
Members of these communities “observed an ancient pattern, 
living near to where they worked and shopping near to where 
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they lived.”65 They were tied together by ethnicity, language, 
religion, churches, employment, and separated by ethnicity, 
language, religion, churches, employment, race, and 
sometimes class.66 They were simultaneously bound together 
and pulled apart. 
Buffalo was growing, and its population “doubled in each 
of the three decades following the Canal’s completion.”67 By 
1860, it ranked 10th in population of cities in the United 
States.68 And it had begun to move beyond its identity as 
solely a site of transshipment and trade, and it had started 
to diversify its economy, branching out into manufacturing, 
particularly factories organized around metalwork.69 
The intermediate aftermath of the Civil War  
[was] not particularly good for Buffalo. The City’s population 
continued growing, but at a substantially slower, forty-five percent 
rate. The reason was fairly simple; the original entrepôt economy 
was fading. By 1869, the combined freight leaving the City on the 
Erie and New York Central railroads exceeded that by canal boat. 
And by 1875 more grain was moving out of the City by rail than by 
canal boat, a proportion that continued to increase. And by the 
1880s the greatest portion of the coal coming to Buffalo was for use 
there, not for transshipment.70  
Railroad expansion rose dramatically in the nation and in 
Buffalo, as did manufacturing.71 First, came basic iron 
production and then manufacturing of coupling devices for 
rail cars, storage batteries for railroad passenger cars, rail 
car axles, etc.72 Buffalo became “a major manufacturing—
metal casting and bending—town. Most manufacturing 
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plants were small, serving niche markets.”73 And not to be 
forgotten, there were nearly twenty active breweries.74  
By the 1890s and into the Teens, Buffalo had become “a 
big city.” “If ever Buffalo’s economy [was] in full bloom, these 
were the years.”75 In 1890, Buffalo was the 11th largest city 
in the country; by the 1900 census it was the 8th, larger than 
Cincinnati, New Orleans, and San Francisco.76 “The Erie 
Canal was of little economic importance anymore,” but the 
railroads were still “to be found almost everywhere in the 
community.”77 And Schlegel observes, 
While the penetration of rail into the fabric of the City was 
important for its economy, it remained an impediment to 
community life because the greatest portion of the original lines into 
Buffalo had been laid at street level. Given the degree that these 
lines had divided the community into many small areas, passage 
from one area to another was both dangerous and haphazard, 
dependent as it was on whether train tracks blocked one’s way.78  
Buffalo benefitted from advancing technology in the 
design and construction of concrete grain elevators with 
massive storage capacity; the building of the Lackawanna 
Steel plant and smaller plants as well; the production of 
motor vehicles (including Pierce Arrow and Ford), light 
trucks, automobile radiators, and windshield wipers; the 
early entrants into the aviation industry (without any roots 




 73.  Id. at 120. 
 74.  Id.  
 75.  Id. at 134. 
 76.  Id. at 122. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. at 123. The City asked the State of New York for help, and a Grade 
Crossing Commission was established, which “labored and litigated for years,” 
and “[e]ventually, it managed to secure agreement on the part of the relevant 
lines to cooperate in the removal of most of the major crossings.” Id. 
 79.  Id. at 124–32. 
2021] SCHLEGEL AND THE MUPPET SHOW 121 
Schlegel believes that “[i]n retrospect, however, there 
were at least three troubling developments in these years.”80 
First, was a reflection of the “meaning for Buffalo’s position 
as the second [largest] rail hub in the United States.”81 The 
city had once been an entrepôt, “first moving goods and 
people from water to water,” and then “between water and 
rail.”82 Now, “it increasingly became more dependent on rail 
for the movement of resources in and goods out.”83 Second, 
was “the disappearance of locally owned companies into 
larger companies that were either owned elsewhere or 
publicly owned and headquartered elsewhere.”84 And finally, 
was “the establishment of Buffalo branches of firms located 
elsewhere.”85 
“Buffalo recovered quickly from the sharp, brief 
recession that followed the end of World War I.”86 But there 
were signs of decline. Though the major train terminal was 
built in the 1920s, passenger traffic decreased.87 Why? The 
automobile had arrived and with it the transformation of 
transportation. Various steel plants were sold to out-of-town 
corporations, including Lackawanna’s sale to Bethlehem. 
Aircraft manufacturing suffered initially, as “Curtiss 
Aeronautical, which was the largest aircraft manufacturer in 
the world, saw its wartime contracts vanish in an instant,” 
and after its reorganization, its founder, Glenn Curtiss, 
“cash[ed] out his interest.”88  
Some Buffalo firms failed during the Depression, but no 
major banks in Buffalo closed. Federal money flowed to 
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building projects, and the downtown development of the 
1920s survived. The waterfront was showing signs of wear 
and tear and decay, as traffic and factories shifted. But the 
trajectory was unmistakable.  
In 1910, the city had slipped from the 8th largest city in the United 
States to the 10th, then 11th in 1920, 13th in 1930 and 14th in 1940 
. . . . While the City’s population grew 13 percent between 1920 and 
1930, suburban growth was 40 percent. Similarly, while the City’s 
population grew less than one percent between 1930 and 1940, 
suburban growth was almost 20 percent.89  
The population movement threatened to recalibrate the core 
of the regional economy.  
Schlegel talks about the impact World War II had on 
shaping the “post-war world economy” and on spurring “the 
shift from an American economy focused on the Great Lakes 
and the Northeastern corridor toward a more national 
economy.”90 But for Buffalo, the war “turned out to have been 
more of an interlude.”91 During the war years, “the area’s war 
plants received contracts in a dollar amount that made it the 
fifth largest defense-contracting site in the country,” though 
it was the fourteenth largest city,92 and “[w]ar work 
necessitated that the Federal Government build several new 
plants,” including Bell Aviation and Curtiss-Wright.93 Many 
of the city’s manufacturing firms began converting and 
engaging in wartime production “seemingly disconnected 
from [their] previous products.”94 “And then,” as Schlegel 
puts it, “it all was over.”95 
What was left in its wake? A relatively robust labor 
movement with a unionized work force, collective bargaining 
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agreements, some strikes and turmoil, and higher wages and 
a growing demand for housing, slowly pushing residential 
development further out from the city.96 And 
“[c]oincidentally, but not wholly coincidentally, the 
geographic structure of the region began to change.”97 The 
change was to accommodate the automobile and other 
vehicular traffic feeding housing, and it arrived in the shape 
of the New York State Thruway and other road building 
projects, in order to enhance economic investment and 
growth. “[F]irst the Erie Canal had structured Buffalo[,] and 
then the railroads had restructured Buffalo, eventually the 
motor vehicle was going to restructure Buffalo.”98 
But as to the traditional order that organized and shaped 
Buffalo’s economic identity, “water, rail, steel, metal 
bending, other manufacturing, banking [eventually], power 
and Downtown,”99 some elements prospered, others 
sputtered. Grain shipment and transshipment on the 
waterfront were still thriving, railroad trackage continued 
its decline, as did freight and passenger service in the face of 
automobile and truck traffic.100 Steel did better, the shape of 
auto manufacturing changed, and “[p]arts manufacturing for 
export to assembly plants located elsewhere seemed to be 
Buffalo’s niche.”101 The aircraft industry postwar had mixed 
success, but there were pockets of “a certain optimism.”102 
The airport was expanded in 1955, defense contracting 
increased, some new firms stirred to life, and some old firms 
“expanded the range of their products.”103 “[B]anks 
prospered during these years, and affiliated lawyers with 
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them . . . .”104 Downtown was holding its own, though 
increasingly threatened by the building of suburban 
shopping centers.105 
The 1950s Buffalo economy, therefore, became a victim 
of two changes. The normal explanation places blame on the 
diversion of traffic and business from Buffalo as a result of 
the combined effects of the opening of the St. Lawrence 
Seaway and the interstate highway system beginning in the 
late 1950s. Schlegel thinks that explanation is faulty. First, 
postwar European grain markets were slow to recover, and 
“[t]he completion of the lock and dam system on the Upper 
Mississippi River permitted the development of a very 
economical all-barge route down that river to a revived port 
in Louisiana, a port that could easily serve South America as 
well as the Pacific basin through the Panama Canal.”106 The 
Buffalo transshipment route to the rail connections to 
Atlantic ports just became more expensive than the water 
route down the Mississippi, even before the Seaway opened, 
and the railroads seemed uninterested in adjusting their rail 
rates and costs to help out Buffalo.107 And, second, “the 
decline in railroad trackage antedates World War I,”108 well 
before the interstate highway system came to fruition. The 
preconditions for decline had already been established. 
The 1960s and 1970s continued the unraveling of 
Buffalo’s economic verities. The transshipment trade and the 
waterfront “became much quieter, though hardly silent,”109 
particularly in grain. “The steel mills still needed deliveries 
of iron ore and limestone, in fact, as the Vietnam War heated 
up such picked up. But after American participation in that 
war ceased[,] steel production began to decline and so [did] 
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shipping to the mills.”110 Changes to railroads “were less a 
result of a narrow combination of law and geographic 
possibilities, than of the legacy of such. The Northeast simply 
came to have too much railroad trackage for the economic 
activity that needed railroad service.”111 Only two passenger 
trains a day served Buffalo by the mid-1960s.112 Mergers 
followed, then bankruptcies, then Amtrak, and the Middle 
East oil price shock.113 “Buffalo’s days as a major rail hub 
were over, as abandoned tracks and empty yards now 
testified.”114 Steel also suffered after the Vietnam War from 
cost competition from foreign steel makers utilizing new 
technology.115 And “[t]he auto industry followed the same 
path as steel with growth in the Sixties and trouble with both 
quality and imports in the Seventies . . . .”116  
Schlegel refers to the 1980s and 1990s as “bottoming 
out.”117 Whatever industry there was, was failing. 
Bethlehem, Republic, and Roblin Steel all closed, as did a 
number of oil refineries and local manufacturers.118 “Autos 
did better, but not well.”119 Some plants closed or moved or 
were divested by the large auto manufacturers and left to go 
it alone. A slight revival occurred in railroading under new 
ownership, which brought back two railroads to Buffalo, just 
as in the 1850s.120 And downtown stores continued to close. 
Buffalo had become a region playing catch-up, and whatever 
planning or public intervention that occurred was a species 
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of slow-motion emergency measures, accompanied by the 
tentative movement to refocus the economy on higher 
education, health care, and high-tech innovation. 
What about the “community” promised in the title of the 
book? Schlegel has news for us:  
Buffalo never was a community. The combination of . . . [the] radial 
street plan; the further fragmentation of the city that the railroads 
brought; an ethnic immigrant population that wanted to live 
together as a defense against those people it could not trust, on one 
hand because they spoke a language that could barely be 
understood and on the other because they were dumb, dirty and 
worshipped in the wrong church, a variety of racism that would only 
increase as later immigrant populations, especially Black, but also 
Hispanic, found this to be a better place to live than the one before. 
The only community that the City and eventually the area had 
was the community of class.121  
What are we left to gather from Buffalo’s experience of 
economic decline? It depended very much on the 
idiosyncrasies upon which the city was built. As Schlegel 
observes, 
For an entrepôt, a change in transportation patterns is key; for a 
manufacturing economy, it is changes in technology, transportation 
costs or what people want. In either case, it is an alteration in the 
underlying competitive position that a particular locality possesses. 
Moreover, for a city that combines these two economic models, the 
two can interact if changes in transportation patterns reduce 
locational positional advantage.122 
Schlegel dates the beginning of Buffalo’s decline to about 
one hundred years ago. To put it another way, the city 
peaked somewhere in the neighborhood of 1900 to 1920, 
when it “slid from the nation’s 8th, to its 11th, most populous 
city.”123 But for Schlegel the more telling statistic is from 
1916, “the year that America’s railroad system began its 
decline by registering the first decrease in active trackage 
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since 1830.”124 The “two World Wars masked the decline of 
the railroads as did the Depression.”125 Freight shippers 
slowly abandoned the railroads for trucks, tractor-trailers, 
airplanes, and pipelines, while passenger travel increasingly 
took place in automobiles and airplanes.  
The various wars and their emphasis on war production 
also hid the steel industry problems from view. In contrast, 
“European and Asian steel makers who rebuilt after WWII, 
rebuilt with the latest technology. As installed American 
capacity wore out, the industry simply contracted. 
Eventually mills were closed . . . .”126 At the end of the day, 
Buffalo preferred an economy of entrenched localism, looking 
inward and to the past as a guiding light.  
II. C. 
Schlegel next turned in Part III of the book to the work 
of Jane Jacobs to find a theory that might explain how 
Buffalo at first succeeded and then declined. He is insistent 
in searching for an applicable theory on framing the right 
questions. And they do not begin with the word “why.” 
Schlegel writes, 
After having listened for years to discussion about why an economy 
has changed, I have become convinced that the why question is in 
fact a proxy for a different set of questions. How can we stop change? 
How can we make things change back? How can we restart growth, 
preferably in the way I want it to occur? Or in desperation, how can 
we restart growth, any growth?127  
“How,” in Schlegel’s accounting, tells us more than “why.” He 
wants to know how things work.  
Schlegel finds Jacobs’s work organized around “three 
assertions. The first is that cities are the basic units of 
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economic life and the source of economic growth, . . . by 
nature economically vibrant and the only real problems with 
city life are the economic or political actions that sap that 
vitality . . . .”128 Second,  
[c]ities grow as they do two things . . . . Initially, local entrepreneurs 
learn how to produce goods that the city has regularly imported . . . . 
These goods both replace the previous imports and can be used as 
exports in trade with other, similarly situated cities. The funds 
freed by the substitution of lower cost, locally produced goods for 
higher cost imports and earned from the newly created exports can 
then be used to purchase new, possibly more sophisticated, 
imports.129  
“[A]nd the cycle repeats itself again and again.”130 Third, 
“[a]s part of the import substitution process, groups of 
producers . . . begin to improve on production processes and 
out of these improvements create both better versions of old 
products, as well as new and different products.”131 Economic 
growth results. 
In Schlegel’s telling, Jacobs “identifies the ‘five great 
economic forces of expansion,’”132 and it is hard not to think 
of the economic history of Buffalo when examining them, 
both for their presence and absence. For Schlegel, the list 
provides a template for how successful cities work: 
1. City growth provides expanded opportunities within the city for 
new and different imports from its region. 2. The technology 
developed in the city makes for increasing agricultural productivity. 
3. While such increased productivity usually leads to diminished job 
opportunities in agricultural areas, city growth opens jobs for those 
so displaced. 4. As cities become congested, it becomes cost effective  
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to move city industrial facilities to nearby areas in the region.  
5. Doing so increases the stock of capital in those areas, both from 
the increase of land values and from the profits earned from the 
goods and services provided by local residents to transplanted 
facilities.133  
If all these components occur more or less at the same time, 
cities grow and “develop their own sub-regional import 
replacing/export creating economies.”134 If those five factors 
are not kept in balance, however, “cities will shape ‘stunted 
and bizarre economies in distant regions,’”135 each in parallel 
to the five features.  
In Jacobs’s catechism of growth, it is also imperative for 
cities pursuing strategies of economic expansion to avoid 
what she calls “transactions of decline.”136 They come in 
three forms: “prolonged and unremitting military 
production; prolonged and unremitting subsidies to poor 
regions; heavy promotion of trade between advanced and 
backward economies.”137 All of these transactions violate her 
basic model for urban economic growth. 
Schlegel’s exposition of Buffalo’s economic history falls 
within Jacobs’s theory of economic dependency and 
transactions of decline. He finds that “[a]ll of the failed 
strategies for economic development that Jacobs identifies as 
such . . . are failed strategies advocated by planners and tried 
in Buffalo’s own economic history.”138 First, as to “prolonged 
and unremitting military production,” he finds limited 
evidence in “the decline of Bell Aircraft, but also in the 
problems at Bethlehem Steel and many other manufacturers 
in finding new markets after wartime contracts were 
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terminated.”139 As to the second, “subsidies to poor regions,” 
he sees “the endless story of the . . . constant search for 
federal, but also state and county, money for urban renewal; 
roadway, subway, sewer and stadium construction; schools; 
and waterfront revival, not to mention various tax breaks 
offered to businesses enlarging, or newly establishing local 
facilities.”140 And as for the third, “trade between advanced 
and backward economies,” the decline “starts as early as the 
great Lackawanna Steel works, its pride in, and the 
recruitment of, branch plants producing goods the profits 
from which flow elsewhere.”141 
The transactions of decline violate Jacobs’s cardinal 
rules because they foster dependency. In the case of military 
production, “while exports are sometimes produced and paid 
for from profits earned elsewhere, only rarely does this work 
lead to innovations that might result in new work.”142 In the 
instance of “subsidies to poor regions,” “no exports are even 
created; tax funds raised from the profits earned elsewhere, 
but also locally, are directed to benefit local life.”143 And 
finally, as to “trade between advanced and backward 
economies,” “exports are produced, sometimes in great 
quantities, but the profits of those exports do not flow back 
to the community in a way that would permit the community 
to use those profits to purchase more and different imports. 
Instead, they flow elsewhere.”144 In all these transactions, 
the city of Buffalo slowly lost control of its fate.  
But Jacobs’s theory also helps Schlegel explain how 
Buffalo once worked:  
  
 
 139.  Id. at 226. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. 
2021] SCHLEGEL AND THE MUPPET SHOW 131 
The area started as a natural resources economy—after all a 
geographic locational advantage is not any less natural than a 
mineral deposit which would be useless were it impossible to reach 
the site or to move the ore to market. Then Buffalo seemed to build 
a diversified import replacing/export creating economy, only to 
slide, through no particular fault of its own, into being a 
transplant/branch plant region. Buffalo stopped being a hotbed of 
innovation and yet hid that fact by remaining an industrial 
monolith that provided good, if dirty and at times dangerous, jobs 
for large numbers, several generations, of immigrants and their 
families.145  
The lesson is pretty clear. Avoid relationships (public 
and private) that create economic dependency and that send 
out false signals and hopes of prosperity. Prosperity is locally 
created and follows from diverse and mixed uses that 
encourage and lead to innovation. For a long time, Buffalo 
existed by the grace of geography and location, and it 
eventually suffered by dint of geography and location as, 
locked in place, it was literally bypassed when it could no 
longer capitalize on what was once its natural advantage. 
The economic world literally moved on as its pace, 
technology, organization, activity, and productivity 
accelerated. As Buffalo lost its capacity to participate 
meaningfully in the newly minted economic changes, it also 
lost its import replacement/export earning cycles.  
Though Schlegel is occasionally critical of Jacobs’s 
insights, it is basically in her work that he has found his 
muse. And in her world, the smaller-scale, diversified 
enterprises provided the economic engine for the city, rather 
than the monoliths that first took advantage of geography 
and location, until the smaller-scale enterprises were 
swallowed up and with them the city’s vitality. The sense of 
community, by which Schlegel seems to mean the middle-
class core, was also hollowed out. In other words, Jacobs and 
Schlegel in some ways prefer, for all its flaws, some version 
of the lost, perhaps anachronistic, associationalist ideal, a 
Main Street theory, focused on maintaining high wages 
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through the high prices that would support the small, local 
retail or wholesale businesses, which were the backbone of 
the community. But these enterprises were increasingly 
threatened as renewed competitive forces replaced 
corporatist cooperation as the prevailing ethic of economic 
activity.  
III. 
About eighty years ago, Karl Llewellyn observed, 
“Jurisprudence as a Philosophy of Law is too narrowly 
conceived” and “modern writers are conceiving it as a 
philosophy not only of Law, but also of Law’s Function, and 
of Law’s Operation, and of Legal Institutions: i.e., of Law and 
Law’s Work.”146 Schlegel has answered Llewellyn’s call in his 
attempts to explicate law’s function, and he has done so as 
well in his related pursuit of the legal historian’s craft. For 
as Schlegel has recently argued, “[t]he question of meaning 
is the heart of historical practice.”147 He believes that 
historical craft resides in determining how people lead their 
lives and in telling stories and shaping narratives about 
what he has discovered. Asking how (he’s not totally opposed 
to asking why from time to time) gets you closer to the 
meaning found in lived experiences, and asking how things 
work gets you closer to the truth.148 
After all these years, Schlegel is still watching.  
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VA. L. REV. 1197, 1199 (2015). 
 148.  On Schlegel and historical truth, see Matthew Steilen, Normativity and 
Objectivity in Historical Writing, 69 BUFF. L. REV. 133 (2021). 
